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Dr. John T. Oliver*
The world's oceans cover over seventy percent of the globe and contain
ninety-seven percent of the world's water.' Many scientists consider the ocean
to be "our greatest resource," but admit that they know "only a fraction of its
secrets .... 2 The oceans have always been a vitally important regime and
provided seemingly inexhaustible resources over which the international
community has long been engaged. The vast ocean spaces have served as
critical avenues for global and regional trade, rich sources of food and
commodities, dumping grounds for human and industrial wastes, broad
defensive barriers and strategic military battle space, limitless subjects for
scientific research, valuable opportunities for recreation, and endless sources
of human wonder and joy.
For most of human history, the world community has taken a laissezfaire
approach to the sea and its resources. However, as states have come to realize
the limits and vulnerabilities of the ocean, and to stake exclusive claims to
sovereignty over them, a consensus has developed that the ocean both needs
and deserves a special legal regime to ensure a clear and appropriate balance
between the various claimants. Moreover, because ocean space could easily
succumb to the adverse consequences of "the tragedy of the commons, 3
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international agreement has proven to be essential to protect its environment
and its resources from uncontrolled use and abuse. The 1982 United Nations
(U.N.) Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS or the Convention),4 which
codifies a broad range of international legal principles applicable to the ocean
regime, represents a tremendous advance in promoting and protecting our
national security and a broad range of other critical ocean policy interests.
UNCLOS promotes many of the most vital interests of the United States.
For that reason, it has achieved wide-spread support. Indeed, it is quite
remarkable when such often divergent voices as the Bush and Obama
Administrations, virtually all congressional Democrats and many leading
Republicans, environmental groups, the national security and intelligence
communities, the fishing, shipping, and telecommunications industries, each of
the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the oil and gas industry, the U.S. Chamber of
Commerce, labor organizations, and nearly every international policy expert all
come together to strongly support the United States becoming party to an
international agreement. 5 But that is the case with respect to Law of the Sea
Convention. While critics suggest that having a "seat at the table" in yet
another U.N. bureaucracy is not worth the possible cost to our sovereignty,6 our
nation's most knowledgeable and engaged ocean policy experts disagree.7 This
the dilemma in which multiple individuals acting independently in their own self-interest can ultimately
destroy a shared resource even where it is clear that it is not in anyone's long term interest for this to happen.
The concept is often applied to the oceans. See, e.g., SUSAN J. BUCK, THE GLOBAL COMMONS: AN
INTRODUCTION 75-78 (Island Press 1998). See also MICHAEL BERRILL, THE PLUNDERED SEAS: CAN THE
WORLD'S FISH BE SAVED 28 (Sierra Club Books 1997).
4. United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Dec. 10, 1982,1833 U.N.T.S 397, available
athttp://www.un.org/Depts/los/conventionagreements/texts/unclos/unclos-e.pdf(last visited Mar. 21,2009)
[hereinafter UNCLOS].
5. James Watkins & Leon Panneta, Letter to the Editor, Law of the Sea Protects US., WASH.
TIMES, Aug. 5, 2008, at A22, available at http://www.jointoceancommission.org/news-room/in-the-news/
2008-08-05_Law of theSeaProtects%20U._S.@WashingtonTimes.pdf (last visited Mar. 21, 2009).
President Obama and Vice President Biden strongly supported the Convention as Senators and candidates
for President. Secretary of State Clinton during her confirmation hearings that the Convention would be a
"priority" with her and that accession was "by order." Senate Confirmation Hearing: Hillary Clinton, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 13, 2009, at A13, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/01/13/us/politics/13text-
clinton.html (last visited Mar. 27, 2009).
6. The "seat at the table" argument has been made in several contexts, including in President
Bush's statement of May 15, 2007. Press Release, George Bush, President, Office of the Press Sec'y,
President Bush's Statement on Advancing U.S. Interests in the World's Oceans (May 15, 2007), available
at http://www.fcnl.org/issues/item.php?itemid=2630&issue-id=101 (last visited Mar. 21, 2009). Critics
have complained that UNCLOS would have adverse consequences to our sovereignty that outweigh any such
benefits. See, e.g., Frank J. Gaffney, Jr., Protect US. Sovereignty: Sink the Law of the Sea Treaty, HUM.
EVENTS, Jan. 28, 2005, available at http://www.humanevents.com/article.php?id=643 l#ci (last visited Mar.
21,2009).
7. For the wide range of individuals and organizations that support the Convention, see Rule of
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article will focus on how UNCLOS will better enable those responsible for
ensuring our national and homeland security, particularly the Coast Guard, to
carry out their many critical missions.
The Law of the Sea Convention was negotiated between 1973 and 1982
during the Administrations of Presidents Nixon, Ford, Carter, and Reagan. The
results of the negotiations reflect a commitment toward a comprehensive regime
to ocean law and policy that both the United States and the Soviet Union made
as far back as 1965.8 It replaces the four out-of-date 1958 Geneva conventions
and provides an effective and balanced framework governing virtually all
aspects of the law of the sea. Among other things, UNCLOS covers: the rights
and obligations of states within their territorial sea, exclusive economic zone
(EEZ), and continental shelf; international straits; the high seas; protection of
the marine environment; marine scientific research; and island and archipelagic
states. It also contains a long-standing goal of the United States: effective,
compulsory provisions to settle most ocean disputes.
UNCLOS is now in force for some 156 states worldwide (plus the
European Union), including virtually all of the major maritime powers and our
allies and trading partners.9 Unfortunately, because of failure to act in the
Senate over the past fifteen years, the United States is not yet a party.
However, there is now a window of opportunity for the United States to regain
its natural leadership position in the development of the international law of the
sea while promoting many of our critical national security, global mobility, and
economic and environmental interests.
This window has not always been open. Nor has the entire Convention
always been so favorable to our vital national interests. When President
Reagan considered the entire text of UNCLOS in the early 1980s, he wisely
identified several unacceptable provisions concerning a newly crafted,
bureaucratic international regime to govern mining activities on the deep
seabed. He called for international engagement to renegotiate the objectionable
provisions. However, President Reagan also made clear that the United States
would comply with the remaining provisions as customary law, because they
reflected an appropriate "balance of interests" and clearly contributed greatly
Law Committee for the Oceans, Index of Endorsements of the Law of the Sea Convention, http://www.
oceanlaw.org/index.phpname=Sections&req=viewarticle&artid=2&page=1 (last visited Mar. 21,2009). See
also UNIV. OF VA., CENTER FOR OCEANS LAW AND POL'Y, U.N. CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF THE SEA
(2008), http://www.virginia.edu/colp/los.html (last visited Mar. 21, 2009).
8. MYRON H. NORDQUIST, U.N. CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF THE SEA 1982: A COMMENTARY
535 (Martinus Mijhoff Publishers 1986).
9. Liberia was the most recent State to accede to the Convention. U.N. DIV. FOR OCEAN AFFAIRS
AND THE LAw OF THE SEA, STATUS OF THE U.N. CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF THE SEA 9 (2008), available
at http://www.un.org/Depts/los/referencefiles/status2008.pdf (last visited Mar. 21, 2009).
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to America's national security interests and economic and environmental well
being."°
Many of our allies agreed with this approach and, working together, in
1994, the United States and others were successful in fixing all of the
objectionable provisions.1" However, despite President Clinton's decision to
forward UNCLOS and the "Part XI Implementing Agreement" to the Senate
that same year, a unanimous (19-0) vote of the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee (SFRC) in support in 2004,12 President Bush's emphatic call to
become party on May 15, 2007,"3 and the 17-4 vote of the SFRC in October
2007, 4 the full Senate has not yet even taken a vote on UNCLOS. The time has
now come for the United States to become party to this vital Convention.
Becoming a party to UNCLOS would greatly enhance the functioning of
our national and homeland security apparatus. In his testimony before the
Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Admiral James Watkins, former Chief of
Naval Operations and the Chairman of the U.S. Commission on Ocean Policy,
called the Convention "the foundation of public order of the oceans."' 5 U.S.
military forces, including Coast Guard units, rely heavily on the many critical
freedoms of navigation, overflight, and operational principles codified in the
Convention. Under the current legal regime, the United States is not guaranteed
such rights. While there is a strong argument that transit passage and
archipelagic sea lane passage have become established rights under customary
international law, not all states agree.
For example, the Islamic Republic ofIran, whose territorial waters overlap
the shipping lanes in the critical Strait of Hormuz, through which much of the
world's oil passes each day, contends that only states party to UNCLOS are
entitled to the full rights of transit passage. 6 Moreover, neither of these critical
10. President Ronald Reagan, Statement on United States Oceans Policy, PUB. PAPERS 378 (Mar.
21, 1983), available at http://www.reagan.utexas.edu/archives/speeches/1983/31083c.htm (last visited Mar.
2, 2009).
11. Bernard H. Oxman, Letter to the Editor, Reagan Supported Most of the Law of the Sea Treaty,
WALL ST. J., Oct. 22, 2007, at A17 available at http://www.oceanlaw.org/index.php?name=News&file
=article&sid=71 (last visited Mar. 21, 2009).
12. S. ExEC. Doc. No. 110-9, at 8 (2007), available at http://www.virginia.edu/colp/pdUUNCLOS-
Sen-Exec-Rpt-1 10-9.pdf (last visited Mar. 21, 2009).
13. See Press Release, George Bush, supra note 6.
14. Kevin Drawbaugh, US. Senate Panel Backs Law of the Sea Treaty, REUTERS, Oct. 31, 2007,
http://www.reuters.com/article/latestCrisis/idUSN31335584 (last visited Mar. 21, 2009).
15. UN. Convention on the Law of the Sea: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Foreign Relations,
108th Cong. 2 (2003) (statement of Admiral James D. Watkins, USN (Ret.), Chairman, U.S. Comm'n on
Ocean Pol'y), available at http://www.foreign.senate.gov/testimony/2003/WatkinsTestimonyO31014.pdf(last
visited Mar. 21, 2009).
16. U.N. Div. for Oceans Affairs and the Law of the Sea, Declarations or Statements Upon
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navigational rights exists under any of the four 1958 Geneva conventions on the
law of the sea, to which the United States continues to be bound. Becoming a
party to the 1982 Convention will supersede our obligations under the 1958
conventions, and will ensure the entire range and extent of our critical mobility
rights in all the ocean waters of the world.
The navigation principles contained in UNCLOS would allow United
States and allied forces to use the world's oceans to meet challenging national
security requirements, including those necessary to fight the Global War on
Terrorism and to project military power overseas. Stephen J. Hadley, President
Bush's National Security Advisor, wrote the Senate in February 2007 to request
that it take positive action on UNCLOS as soon as possible, arguing, among
other things, that "the Convention protects navigational rights critical to
military operations and essential to the formulation and implementation of the
President's National Security Strategy, as well as the National Strategy for
Maritime Security."'17 The Convention provides the most effective means to
exercise U.S. leadership in the management and development of the law of the
sea. UNCLOS facilitates combined operations with our coalition partners-all
the rest of whom are parties to the Convention-through a commitment to a
common set of rules, such as those governing the Proliferation Security
Initiative (PSI).'"
Our national maritime security strategy has long required world-wide
mobility. Innocent passage includes the rights of foreign military vessels to
engage in innocent passage through the territorial sea of coastal states. The
Convention protects these rights, specifically and objectively enumerating what
actions would constitute a violation of "innocent passage."' 9 Global mobility
also requires undisputed access through, under, and over international straits,
such as the Strait of Malacca and Strait of Hormuz, and archipelagic waters,
UNCLOS Ratification, Islamic Republic of Iran, Interpretative Declaration on the Subject of Straits (2007),
available at http://www.un.org/Depts/los/convention-agreements/convention-declarations.
htm#Iran%20Upon%20signature (last visited Mar. 21, 2009). Iran's declaration states, inter alia, that the
"right of transit passage through straits used for international navigation [is a product of] quidpro quo'" and
that only "states parties to the Law of the Sea Convention shall be entitled to benefit ... ." Id.
17. Letter from Stephen J. Hadley, Nat'l Sec. Advisor, Nat'l Sec. Affairs, to Sen. Joseph R. Biden,
Jr., Chairman, S. Comm. on Foreign Relations (Mar. 21, 2007), available at http://www.jag.navy.mil
documents/HadleyLetter.pdf (last visited Mar. 21, 2009).
18. "The Convention serves as a foundation for our partnerships in the Proliferation Security
Initiative." S. Treaty Doc. No. 103-39, at 2, 4 (2007) (written testimony of John D. Negroponte, Dep't
Secretary, Sen. Foreign Relations Comm.), available at http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/
1 12802.pdf (last visited Mar. 21, 2009). "Joining is a win/win proposition." Id. See generally BUREAU OF
INT'L SEC. ANDNONPROLIFERATION, U.S DEPT. OF STATE, INTERDICTION PRINCIPLESFORTHEPROLIFERATION
SECtRrrY INrIATIVE 2 (2002), available at http://www.state.gov/t/isn/c27726.htm (last visited Mar. 21,
2009).
19. UNCLOS, supra note 4, art. 18, 19.
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such as the key sea lanes through Indonesia and the Philippines. The relevant
provisions of the Convention guarantee these critically important transit rights
to military and civilian vessels, aircrafts, and submarines, no matter the purpose
of the transit, the cargo, or the means of propulsion. From a national security
and global mobility perspective, these various passage rights are among the
"crown jewels" of the Convention.2"
A second critical right that UNCLOS guarantees is the ability to operate
and conduct exercises in international waters beyond the territorial sea. Prior
to the Convention, many coastal states were insisting on the right to exercise
complete sovereignty out to as far as 200 miles or more from their land
territory. While the Convention's provisions establish the right of coastal states
to claim a 200 nautical mile (nm) exclusive economic zone, they may only
exercise sovereign rights over economic activities, such as fishing, the
exploration for and production of oil and gas from under the seabed, and the
construction of artificial islands. Under the Convention, coastal states may not
restrict freedom of navigation, including military training exercises, law-
enforcement activities, and overflight within the EEZ.
These provisions are of great benefit to our national security and global
mobility interests. In addition to the global reach of the U.S. Navy and Air
Force, Coast Guard units patrol the Persian Gulf, the Caribbean Sea, the eastern
Pacific, and other vital maritime areas. There is a disturbing movement among
some coastal states to attempt to transform their EEZs into the equivalent of a
territorial sea, in which they may limit critical navigational freedoms. The U.S.
Navy is concerned about apparent government attempts in China and Iran, for
example, to assert excessive control over foreign operations within the EEZ as
an "anti-access or sea denial strategy."'" In March 2009, five Chinese vessels
"aggressively" shadowed and harassed the USNS Impeccable as it conducted
operations in international waters seventy-five nm south of Hainan Island in the
South China Sea.22 The United States must not sit on the sidelines while the
international community is working out the nuances of how UNCLOS is to be
interpreted and applied.
20. "Innocent passage, transit passage, and archipelagic sealanes passage are the crown jewels of
navigation and overflight. These rights are vital not just to our Navy, but also to our Army, Air Force, Marine
Corps, and Coast Guard." UN. Convention on the Law of the Sea: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on
Foreign Relations, 110th Cong., 4 (2007) (statement of Admiral Patrick Walsh, U.S. Navy, Vice Chief of
Naval Operations), available at http://www.jag.navy.mil/documents/testWalshTestimony070927.pdf (last
visited Mar. 21, 2009).
21. James Kraska, The Law of the Sea Convention: A National Security Success-Global Strategic
Mobility through the Rule of Law, 39 GEO. WASH. INT'L L. REV 543, 558 (2007).
22. Ann Scott Tyson, China Draws U.S. Protest Over Shadowing of Ships, WASH. POST, Mar. 10,
2009, at A8, available at http'//www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/03/09/
AR2009030900956.html (last visited Mar. 27,2009).
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There is also a disturbing trend with respect to excessive baseline claims.
Baselines are important, because it is from them that the various maritime
zones, including the territorial sea, contiguous zone, and exclusive economic
zone, are measured. Landward of the baselines are the coastal states internal
waters, such as ports, bays, and estuaries. Under the Convention, the "normal
baseline" is the low water line along the coast.2 3 However, the Convention also
provides criteria for the establishment of "straight baselines" and closing lines
along coastlines that are "deeply indented and cut into," fringed with islands in
the "immediate vicinity," or both.24
There is an interesting true story that highlights the national security
importance of straight baselines, and the importance of avoiding uncertainty
through agreed-upon, objective legal criteria. In the opening scenes from the
movie, "Hunt for Red October," Sean Connery played the role of a Soviet
submarine captain in charge of a new Soviet submarine with a revolutionary
propulsion system heading out to sea from the Russian naval base at Murmansk.
A fictionalized Los Angeles class nuclear submarine, USS Dallas, was waiting
off the mouth of that bay for Red October to emerge. The U.S. submarine
planned to gather intelligence as it secretly trailed its Soviet "adversary." This
is similar to the intelligence activities that take place in real life.
In the mid-1980s the Soviets had drawn a system of straight baselines in
the Arctic Ocean. Segment 8-9 is a twenty-six nm line that enclosed Motovsky
and Kola Bays. According to the military experts writing in press and magazine
accounts, on February 11, 1992, USS Baton Rouge was lurking in what it
thought to be international waters when it and a Sierra-class Russian submarine
collided.25 In the ensuing diplomatic dispute, the U.S. Navy claimed that the
collision occurred more than twelve miles from the "normal baseline," the
shoreline, which placed it well within international waters. However, Russia
claimed that the U.S. submarine was operating illegally while submerged within
its territorial sea as measured from their claimed straight baseline.
Years later, when another Russian submarine, Kursk, sank under mysterious
circumstances in the same general area, the Russian Navy immediately claimed
that it was the fault of the United States, which had intelligence gathering
submarines in the area monitoring the Russian exercises.26 If the United States
23. UNCLOS, supra note 4, art. 5.
24. Id. art. 7. See also id arts. 8-14.
25. Eugene Miasnikov, Submarine Collision off Murmansk: A Look From Afar, 2 BREAK-
THROUGHS 19 (Winter 1992/1993), available at http'//I 8.48.0.3 1/ssp/Breakthroughs/1992-93-Winter.pdf(last
visited Mar. 21, 2009). See also John H. Cushman, Two Subs Collide OffRussian Port, N.Y. TIMES, Feb.
19, 1992, at A6, available at http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9EOCE5DA163CF93
AA25751 COA964958260 (last visited Mar. 21,2009); Bill Gertz,Russian Sub's Sail Damaged in Collision,
WASH. TIMES, Feb. 27, 1992, at A4.
26. Ian Traynor, Debris Found Near Kursk Linked to British and US. Submarines, GUARDIAN,
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and Russia were both Party to the Convention, we would likely be able to resolve
the legality of this particular baseline segment and avoid such potential incendiary
incidents. We continue to have similar disputes concerning excessive straight
baseline claims with many other countries all over the world, including China,
Iran, Colombia, and Vietnam.
The Law of the Sea Convention also provides a solid and workable legal
and policy framework for the Coast Guard to interdict maritime terrorists,
pirates, illicit drug traffickers, smugglers, and illegal immigrants, both in our
own waters and in the seas beyond. The Convention guarantees that our
warships and Coast Guard cutters will enjoy sovereign immune status wherever
Sept. 5, 2000, at 12, available at http://www.guardian.co.ukworld/2OOO/sep/O5/kursk.russia (last visited
Mar. 21, 2009).
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in the world they may be operating. In a speech before the Brookings Institute,
Senator Richard G. Lugar argued:
As the world's preeminent maritime power, the largest importer and
exporter, the leader in the war on terrorism, and the owner of the
largest Exclusive Economic Zone off our shores, the United States
has more to gain than any other country from the establishment of
order and predictability with respect to the oceans.27
The Joint Chiefs of Staffwrote the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in June
2007: "From sustaining forward deployed military forces, to ensuring the
security of our ports and waters as well as advancing our most important
economic and foreign policy objectives, it is important that the United States
becomes a party to the Convention., 28
The provisions of UNCLOS also directly promote the mission of the U.S.
Coast Guard to help protect and manage the living and non-living off-shore
resources. The various provisions on the protection of the marine environment
are particularly important. At the same time, the Convention does so in a way
that limits coastal state sovereign rights in international waters to economic
activities, such as off-shore fishing and the generation of alternative forms of
energy, and provides an appropriate balance on the jurisdiction to prescribe and
enforce environmental laws within the EEZ. By doing so, UNCLOS ensures
the inclusive navigational and overflight interests of all countries.
Moreover, from an economic perspective, the United States emerges a
clear winner under these provisions of the Convention on the EEZ. Because of
its lengthy coastline and island possessions that border on several particularly
productive ocean areas, the United States has the largest and richest EEZ in the
world. In addition, our extended continental shelf has enormous potential in
yet-to-be-discovered oil and gas reserves, particularly in the Gulf of Mexico,
Bering Sea, and Arctic Ocean. Working in cooperation with other states,
UNCLOS provides the strong and consistent framework to develop additional
prudent and workable international standards to protect the marine
environment.
Recent discoveries by the U.S. Coast Guard (USCG) icebreaker Healy
reveal that the U.S. continental shelf in the Arctic Ocean is much more
extensive than originally thought. Only by becoming party to UNCLOS and
27. Senator Richard G. Lugar, Address at the Brookings Inst., The Law of the Sea Convention: The
Case for S. Action (May 4, 2004), available at http://www.brookings.edu/speeches/2004/0504energy_
lugar.aspx (last visited Mar. 21, 2009).
28. Letter from Peter Pace & E. P. Giambastiani, Chairmen, Joint Chiefs of Staff, to Joseph Biden,
Jr., Chairman, Comm. on Foreign Relations (June 26, 2007), available at http://www.virginia.edu/
colp/pdf/Biden-Letter-JointChiefs.pdf (last visited Mar. 21, 2009).
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participating in its processes, however, can the United States obtain secure title
to these vast resources, adding some 290,000 square miles for sovereign
resource exploitation.2 9 Moreover, no American business enterprise is likely
to invest the many billions of dollars necessary to develop a distant, deep-water
off-shore oil or gas field, no matter how rich it might be, unless it has an
undisputed right to do so under both domestic and international law.3 ° In
addition, the Convention's deep seabed mining provisions, as amended in 1994,
would permit and encourage American businesses to pursue free-market-
oriented approaches to deep ocean mining. The 1994 "Part XI Implementing
Agreement" was crafted in such a way so as to protect the interests of investors
and the United States.3 As a result, the off-shore oil and gas and mining
industries all strongly support accession to UNCLOS. Economic self-
sufficiency and development of off-shore ocean resources contribute directly
to our national security.
Other Coast Guard missions that the Convention would promote include
port and maritime security, law-enforcement, and environmental protection.
While guaranteeing rights of innocent passage and the right to seek safe haven
in the event of life-threatening storms and other conditions (which the law
refers to as force majeure), UNCLOS reemphasizes the jurisdictional rights of
coastal states within their inland waters, such as harbors and rivers, and within
the twelve nm territorial sea. As a result, the Convention would enhance the
Coast Guard's ability to protect our nation's coastal security interests.
The United States could use the provisions of UNCLOS effectively to
combat excessive maritime claims, which can interfere with narcotics
interdiction and other law-enforcement efforts. Several critical coastal states
continue to claim territorial seas of 200 nautical miles, in violation of the
Convention's twelve nm limit. These countries see our law-enforcement
operations in their claimed territorial seas as violations of their sovereignty and
29. BENJAMIN FRIEDMAN & DANIEL FRIEDMAN, BIPARTISAN SEC. GROUP POL'Y BRIEF, HOW THE
LAW OF THE SEA CONVENTION BENEFITS THE UNITED STATES 5 (2004), available at http://www.gsinstitute.
org/docs/1 1-20-04_UNCLOS.pdf (last visited Feb. 26, 2009).
30. Full Comm. UN Convention on the Law of the Sea: Hearing Before the Comm. on Env't and
Pub. Works, 108th Cong. (2004) (statement of Paul Kelly, Senior Vice President, U.S. Comm'n of Ocean
Pol'y), available at http.//epw.senate.gov/public/index.cfin?FuseAction=Hearings.Testimony&Hearing_
ID=f463432c-802a-23ad-42d9-94b940bb129f&Witness_ID=9a94508f-59fd-426a-9130-ab462789b786 (last
visited Mar. 21, 2009).
31. FRIEDMAN, supra note 29, at 2. "Twelve years of further negotiation got the United States what
it wanted.... The 1994 agreement also included renegotiated voting rules that would allow the United States
to veto any proposed rules relating to the distribution of ISA revenues, were it to join the Convention."
Agreement Relating to the Implementation of Part XI of the U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea, G.A.
Res. 48/263, §§ 3, 5, U.N. Doc. A/RES/48/263 (Dec. 10, 1982), available at http://www.un.org/documents/
ga/res/48/a48r263.htm (last visited Mar. 21, 2009).
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are either reluctant or refuse to cooperate with proposed actions against vessels
engaged in drug-smuggling interdicted in these disputed areas. Since we are
not now party to UNCLOS, it is very difficult for us to argue credibly that they
must give up these excessive claims.
The result is that counter-drug bilateral agreements with these nations are
difficult, interdiction efforts in their claimed territorial seas are hampered, and
our negotiating ability to change the situation is compromised. The Convention
also promotes our authority to protect our ocean waters, seashores, and ports
from a wide variety of environmental threats. Admiral Thad Allen, the
Commandant of the Coast Guard, and the four previous Commandants have
strongly advocated becoming party to UNCLOS as soon as possible, largely
because it would promote the ability of the Coast Guard to accomplish its
homeland security and law-enforcement missions. 2
Another key purpose of the Coast Guard is to promote safe and secure
international trade. The Convention promotes the freedom of navigation and
overflight by which international shipping and transportation help supercharge
the global economy. Some ninety percent of global trade tonnage, totaling over
six trillion in value, including oil, iron ore, coal, grain, and other commodities,
building materials, and manufacturer goods, travels on and over the world's
oceans and seas each year.33 By guaranteeing merchant vessels and aircraft
their right to navigate on, over, and through international straights, archipelagic
waters, and coastal zones, the provisions of UNCLOS promote dynamic
international trade. It reduces costs and eliminates delays that would occur if
coastal states were able to impose the restrictions on such navigational rights
that existed prior to the Convention.
At the same time, UNCLOS encourages international cooperation to
enhance the safety and security of all ocean-going ships. Whether it involves
lumber and winter wheat shipped from the Pacific Northwest to Japan, high-
quality, low-cost goods from Singapore to Long Beach, or oil from the Persian
Gulf to Europe, free, safe, and secure commercial navigation and flights
provide great economic and security benefits to all ofus. That is the key reason
the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, shipping industry, aviation industry, and other
32. Press Release, Thad Allan, Admiral, U.S. Coast Guard, Convention on the Law of the Sea (May
17,2007), available at https://www.piersystem.com/go/doc/786/156912/ (last visited Mar. 21,2009). Letter
from Thomas H. Collins et al., Retired U.S. Coast Guard, to Joseph Biden, Chairman, Foreign Relations
Comm. (Aug. 15, 2007), available at http://www.jag.navy.mil/documents/Former/ 20Commandants
%20oP/o2OUSCG.pdf (last visited Mar. 21, 2009).
33. Shipping Facts: Information about the International Shipping Industry Home Page,
http://www.marisec.org/shippingfacts/home/ (last visited Mar. 21, 2009). Memorandum from Dep't of
Transp. on Maritime Admin.: Strategic Plan for Fiscal Years 2003-08 (Sept. 2003), available at
http://www.dot.gov/stratplan2008/strategicplan.htm (last visited Mar. 21, 2009).
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international trade groups have called for immediate accession to the
Convention.
UNCLOS would also greatly enhance the global leadership position of the
United States in maritime affairs, an area in which the Coast Guard has long
played a vital role. Many states have excessive claims with respect to
baselines, historic bays, territorial seas, straits, and navigational restrictions
which, in the opinion of many, are not permissible under the Convention. As
a non-party, our ability to seek to roll back these excessive claims is severely
inhibited. Failure to accede to UNCLOS will materially interfere with our
ability to engage with other states to improve maritime governance, a maj or part
of the Coast Guard's current strategy for maritime safety, security, and
stewardship. Our non-party status is an obstacle that we must overcome in
developing virtually any new multilateral maritime instrument. For example,
several key states whom we want to join the Proliferation Security Initiative
(PSI) often question our non-party status. Likewise, while the United States has
long played a key role in the International Maritime Organization (IMO) to
promote maritime safety and efficiency and to protect the marine environment,
our leadership position is being undermined by our current outsider status.
As a non-party, the United States has no "seat at the table" in virtually all
matters concerning the Convention. The United States does not have a judge
on the Law of the Sea Tribunal nor a decision-maker or staff experts on the
Continental Shelf Committee. And despite the fact that the 1994 "Part XI
Implementation Agreement" guarantees the United States a permanent seat on
the International Seabed Authority (ISA) and a veto on all key decisions of that
body, as a non-party, we cannot play that critical role. In article after article,
UNCLOS reflects diplomatic victory after victory for the United States.
However, as a non-party, we cannot take advantage of these benefits. One of
the key reasons that the congressionally mandated U.S. Commission on Ocean
Policy has consistently and unanimously called for the United States to accede
to the Convention was to regain its ocean policy leadership position.
In contrast to the nearly unanimous support from the nation's military and
civilian national security leadership, ocean policy experts, international trade
and shipping communities, oil and gas industry, off-shore mining industry,
marine science and environmental groups, and legal associations, a small
coterie of strident opponents have echoed a number of badly flawed arguments
against the Convention. In responding to those arguments, John Norton Moore,
who served as ambassador for the law of the sea negotiations under Presidents
Nixon and Ford, and Lawrence Eagleburger, Secretary of State under President
H. W. Bush, recently co-authored an article in support of UNCLOS that re-
jected each of these allegations as fallacious. Their article concluded: "Foreign
policy issues deserve debate, but not shameful distortions. The Senate must not
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cede its role to uninformed voices, especially when our president and national
security leaders are on record as to what is in our country's interest ....
Rather than diminishing U.S. sovereignty, the Convention would greatly
expand it. Rather than restricting our military's ability to operate at sea,
UNCLOS would guarantee it. Rather that constraining the development of oil,
gas, and other minerals from the continental shelf and deep seafloor, the
Convention would encourage and protect such investments. Critics have falsely
alleged that UNCLOS would somehow impose restrictions on our sea-based
military and intelligence operations. But, according to intelligence and legal
experts that J. M. McConnnell, the Director of National Intelligence, cited in
his letter to the Select Committee on Intelligence of August 8, 2007, the
Convention would actually enhance our intelligence and security interest.35
Moreover, after conducting several classified and unclassified hearings and
receiving testimony from intelligence, military, and legal experts, the Senate's
Select Committee on Intelligence concluded that intelligence activities are "not
adversely affected by the Convention."36
The specific argument that the Convention would prevent the United
States from using its submarines to collect intelligence is fallacious. Several
sources, including the Minority Views in the Senate Committee on Foreign
Relations, note that Article 20 of the Convention requires submarines and other
underwater vehicles to navigate on the surface and show their flag when
engaged in innocent passage.37 This is correct, so far as it goes. But the
minority report then concludes that this would "fail to protect the significant
role submarines have played, especially during the Cold War, in gathering
intelligence very close to foreign shorelines."3
What the minority report fails to mention is that the 1958 Convention on
the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone, to which the United States has
long been party, contains exactly the same restriction.39 Moreover, the
34. Lawrence S. Eagleburger & John Norton Moore, Opportunity on the Oceans; America Wins
with theLaw of the Sea Treaty, WASH. POST, July 30,2007, at Al 5, available at http://www.washingtonpost.
com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/07/29/AR2007072900860.html (last visited Mar. 21, 2009).
35. S. EXEC. Doc. No. 110-9, supra note 12, at 32.
36. S. Treaty Doc. No. 103-39, supra note 18, at 17. The Convention does not prohibit or impair
intelligence or submarine activities. Joining the Convention would not affect the conduct of intelligence in
any way. This issue was the subject of extensive hearings in 2004 before the Senate Select Committee on
Intelligence. Witnesses from Defense, CIA, and State all confirmed that U.S. intelligence and submarine
activities are not adversely affected by the Convention.
37. UNCLOS, supra note 4, art. 20.
38. S. EXEC. Doc. NO. 110-9, supra note 12, at 27.
39. Convention on the Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone art. 14, § 6, Apr. 29, 1958, 15 U.S.T.
1606, 516 U.N.TS. 205, available at http://untreaty.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/conventions/
8_1_1958 territorial-sea.pdf (last visited Mar. 21, 2009).
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collection of intelligence in any guise within the territorial sea is not "innocent
passage." '40 Such operations are called espionage, not innocent passage. The
United States would never accept foreign submarines or foreign warships
engaging in intelligence-gathering operations in the territorial sea off of San
Diego or Norfolk. Indeed, when President Reagan signed a proclamation
extending the U.S. territorial sea to twelve nm on December 27, 1988,
consistent with the Convention,4 one of the first things that the Coast Guard
did was to advise a Soviet military vessel gathering intelligence just a few miles
off of Pearl Harbor to leave the area immediately.4 2 The U.S. military and
intelligence communities are well aware that the Convention would have a
positive impact on our national security. Moreover, as Senator Richard Lugar,
ranking minority member of the Foreign Relations Committee, has argued, it
would be unprecedented for the Senate to deny to our nation's military and
national security leadership a tool that they have unanimously claimed that they
need, especially during a time of war.43
The Coast Guard has many critical national and homeland security
missions to perform in ocean space. Simply stated, if the United States were
to join UNCLOS, the Coast Guard and the other military services could better
use ocean space to carry out these important security missions much more
effectively. As a party to the Convention, the State Department and other
agencies of the U.S. government could assert our legal and policy positions on
ocean issues from a position of strength. The window of opportunity to accede
to the Convention is now wide open. Let us now recognize the wisdom of
becoming a party to UNCLOS and seize the opportunity to realize the many
important benefits that will accrue to our national interest. Moreover, once we
become party, let us use our natural leadership position to actively and
effectively engage with other states to help guide implementation of the
Convention in a way that best ensures our national and international interests.
International engagement on the law of the sea can only promote the ability of
the Coast Guard to accomplish its many missions.
40. UNCLOS, supra note 4, art. 19 § (2)(c).
41. Proclamation No. 5928, 54 Fed. Reg. 777 (Jan. 9, 1989).
42. See Andrew Rosenthal, Reagan Extends Territorial Waters to 12 Miles, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 29,
1988, at A 17, available at http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=940DE1 DE 173 AF93AA 15751
C 1A96E948260&scp=l 3&sq=andrew/o20rosenthal%20-%20reagan&st=cse (last visited Mar. 21, 2009).
The author was a member of the U.S. delegation participating in U.S.-USSR talks on the law of the sea when
this incident took place. A member of the Russian delegation explained to the author the nature of the
challenge to the Russian AGI intelligence vessel.
43. Press Release, Richard Lugar, Sen., Opening Statement for Hearing on Law of the Sea (Sept.
27,2007), available at http://lugar.senate.gov/press/record.cfm?id=284357&&year=2007 (last visited Mar.
21, 2009).
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